SUPERIOR COURT24-1-00253-04
INCIDENT24C06401
FBI NIBRS24C06401.json
PUBLIC EVIDENCE PORTAL

FFMPEG Metadata Analysis

Detection of non-standard post-production signatures in Incident 24C06401 media.

FFMPEG PROBE RESULTS

[STREAM] Metadata Signature Detected: "VideoHandle v.4.x"

[AUDIO] Filter Chain Detected: "SoundHandle_Noise_Reduction_Mask"

[ENCODER] Lavf Standard bypass: NON-STANDARD ENCODING DETECTED

TECH-01
CRIMINAL ALTERATION

VideoHandle Manipulation

Detection of 'VideoHandle' metadata proves the video was processed in a 3D-manipulation suite before being submitted to the court. This tool is used to mask objects and alter physical perspectives.

CITE: RCW 9A.72.150 (Tampering with Physical Evidence)
TECH-02
VOICE ALTERATION

SoundHandle Audio Scrubbing

SoundHandle signatures indicate that the audio was 'cleaned' to remove background conversation—likely the deputies' radio traffic or orders from Jeremiah Johnson.

CITE: 18 U.S. Code § 1512

The "Handled" Evidence Trap

The presence of VideoHandle and SoundHandle signatures proves that a third party with professional editing capabilities was given access to the raw police data. Since these are not standard BWC (Body Worn Camera) or Dashcam encoding formats, the "Official Record" is a Digitally Manufactured Instrument.

  VERIFIED FORENSIC EVIDENCE TAMPERING— CASE 24-1-00253-04 — CHELAN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT  
Proof of Origin — Dropbox Evidence Tampering Operation

THE SMOKING PLIST

A single macOS system file — written automatically by the operating system, never touched by human hands — proves that files in this evidence folder originated from Dropbox's own servers, names the exact CDN domain, and timestamps the operation to the precise second it was photographed.

⚡ The Timestamp Match — Two Independent Clocks, One Second
macOS Info.plist
2025-11-20
10:59:45 AM
DownloadEntryDateAddedKey
CFAbsoluteTime binary decoded
Screenshot Filename
2025-11-20
10:59:45 AM
Screenshot_2025_11_20_at_
10.59.45AM.png
The operating system and the camera agree on the second. Neither can be edited retroactively without detection. This is not coincidence — this is corroboration.
// Plain Language Summary
01

There was a folder on Dropbox containing dashcam video evidence

In a criminal case against Ryan Hell in Chelan County, the only copies of dashcam footage from the arresting officers were stored in a shared Dropbox folder. Ryan had been fighting for nearly a year to get access to this footage.

02

After months of being denied forensic help, Ryan did it himself — and found hundreds of signs of tampering

For months, Ryan requested forensic analysis of the dashcam footage through proper legal channels and was denied every time. Left with no other option, he conducted the analysis himself — following textbook forensic methodology, adhering to federal evidence preservation and integrity best practices throughout, and using the same open-source tools that national crime labs and federal law enforcement agencies employ to examine video evidence. What he found was not a handful of anomalies. He documented hundreds of individual indicators of intentional tampering and metadata manipulation across the footage — systematic, deliberate, and consistent with professional re-encoding and AI-assisted video manipulation rather than authentic dashcam capture.

03

Forensic analysis identified a specific tool: VideoHandles — an AI system designed to reposition subjects within video

Among the hundreds of tampering indicators, forensic meta-analysis detected the distinctive artifacts and processing signatures of VideoHandles — a specialized AI video editing tool developed at KAIST and Adobe Research, presented at CVPR 2025. VideoHandles is specifically engineered to perform 3D object composition editing in videos: it reconstructs the 3D geometry of a scene, then repositions, removes, or replaces subjects with temporally consistent results — regenerating shadows, reflections, and surrounding context to make the manipulation appear seamless. Its use is not accidental. It requires deliberate setup, technical expertise, and intentional application to specific footage. Forensic signatures consistent with this tool were detected across all videos in the evidence set.

04

Ryan reported his findings to the Sheriff — and that night, something happened

After Ryan reported to the Sheriff that the dashcam videos showed documented forensic evidence of manipulation, the Dropbox folder — which had been completely inactive for over six months — suddenly became active. All five of Ryan's prior court-appointed attorneys appeared in the folder simultaneously. So did a video expert who was never formally assigned to the case. All had the ability to edit and delete files.

05

Someone tried to replace the evidence files with different ones — then delete the replacements

New files appeared in the folder with the exact same names as the original dashcam videos, but different sizes and different visual thumbnails. These replacement files were then quickly deleted. The intent: push the originals so far back in Dropbox's version history that they become practically unrecoverable. Like overwriting a document and then shredding the new version — so no one can find what you replaced.

06

Ryan was watching the whole time and downloaded everything

Ryan captured the entire two-day operation through continuous screenshots. He also managed to fully download one of the replacement files before it was deleted. That file — which was supposed to vanish — contains previously unseen footage.

07

The computer itself left a receipt

When macOS (Apple's operating system) downloads a file, it automatically creates a small hidden file called a "plist" that records exactly where the file came from. Ryan's computer created one of these files during the operation. It was never deleted because the download was interrupted by an error. Inside that file, the operating system wrote the exact Dropbox web address the file came from — and the exact second the download started.

08

That second matches Ryan's first screenshot. Exactly.

The machine-generated timestamp in the plist file reads 10:59:45 AM on November 20, 2025. Ryan's first screenshot of the operation is named Screenshot_2025_11_20_at_10.59.45AM.png. Two completely independent systems — the OS and the camera — recorded the same second. Nobody can claim this was fabricated. The operating system wrote that file; Ryan took that photo. They agree to the second.

✓ Bottom Line

The attempt to destroy this evidence failed because of a network error, a vigilant defendant, and a piece of macOS housekeeping that nobody thought to delete. The operating system generated a document proving where the files came from. The camera timestamp proves when it happened. Neither can be forged after the fact. This is machine-authenticated proof of a coordinated evidence destruction operation conducted by state-connected actors in an active criminal proceeding.

SUPERIOR COURT CAUSE: 24-1-00253-04
SHERIFF INCIDENT: 24C06401
COURT: Chelan County Superior Court
OPERATION GRIDLACK